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♦ 
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  Within the context of the prevailing situation that came about as a result of the 
rejection of the EU constitutional treaty in 2005 and the subsequent inefficient reflection 
period, Spain has been faced with several options and scenarios. Each presents risks and 
opportunities in terms of contributing to the rescue of the original text, its possible 
transformation, or its termination. In any event, it appeared that the Spanish leadership 
wanted to make the point that if “Europe is the problem, Spain is the solution”, rewriting 
Ortega’s historical assessment (Ortega, Obras). This paper first analyzes the options, 
scenarios and possible outcomes, with a special emphasis on the activities led by the new 
Spanish government elected in 2004. It then concludes with a commentary on the 
contribution to the agreement made at the end of the German presidency of the EU in 
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June of 2007, opening the way for a new Intergovernmental Conference and “Reform 
Treaty”.   
 
Anniversaries and symbols    
 
  The year 2007 was considered to be decisive for the EU organization for the 
coincidental reason that, fifty years earlier, the EU took its second daring step with the 
Rome Treaty of March 1957, which transformed the initial European Coal and Steel 
Community (ECSC), officially born in 1951, by incorporating the European Economic 
Community (EEC) and the European Atomic Energy Community (EUROATOM). The 
new entity was collectively and legally called the European Communities. Then it was 
simplified to be known as the European Community (EC), though it would come to be 
popularly called the Common Market (which is only one of the fundamental ingredients 
of the EEC), a label still used by generations of Europeans. 
  This thoroughly economic dimension signaled that the new creation had made it 
to the third stage of economic integration. It had also graduated from the second stage, 
the Customs Union, which imposed a system of common tariffs. It had come a long way 
from the ECSC, the first experiment that included (in a limited common market) only two 
products. However, these products were strategic and necessary to produce weapons. The 
new entity was intended to ''make war unthinkable'' and eventually ''materially 
impossible''. 
  In the mid-1980s, almost three decades after the Rome Treaty, the architects of 
the experiment realized that in order to complete the Common Market, as contracted in 
1957, they would need to issue and implement over three hundred individual regulations. 
This was the only way to guarantee the full circulation of goods, capital, services, and 
people. And so Jacques Delors, president of the Commission, the EC's executive body, 
convinced the Council of the need to approve the Single European Act (SEA) in 1986, 
which would also paved the way for the Maastricht Treaty (1992) that created the 
European Union. 
  The EU was then strengthened considerably by two bold moves. First, the EU 
adopted the euro as a common currency (anchoring the fourth level of integration, a 
monetary union). The impasse of the constitutional process marks its presence five years 
since the adoption of the euro by 300 million citizens in the thirteen countries of the EU, 
as well as a handful of mini-states that had previously used the currencies of the EU 
Member States. The euro was a success in all basic monetary operations. Although the 
dollar remains dominant in terms of the setting of prices and tallying debt, as an exchange 
currency the euro is on the verge of surpassing it. And while the dollar remains ahead of 
the euro as the official reserve currency, the euro is catching up in this regard as well.
1  
Second, the EU proceeded to execute the most spectacular broadening in its 
history --it almost doubled in size-- with three phases of additions. In 1995, Austria, 
Finland, and Sweden were incorporated, once they exhausted their ''neutral'' stance during 
the post-war period. Then in 2004, ten countries were added in a single move, eight of 
which had been part of the Soviet bloc for almost sixty years, plus Cyprus and Malta. 
And at beginning of 2007, two other countries, Romania and Bulgaria, joined the EU, 
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bringing the total of members to 27. The EU already comprises half a billion people. All 
of this has been accomplished in just fifteen years since the end of the cold war.
2 
  However, while these two ambitious moves proved to be highly successful, the 
warnings made simultaneously about the need for institutional reform of an organization 
used to dealing with fifteen more-or-less collegial members have not diminished. In 
response, the EU committed itself to complete its legal framework with the approval of a 
constitutional treaty that would serve to codify and update the various proposals to render 
the integration project more viable and effective and give it an international profile more 
in keeping with demands of today's complex world. Unfortunately, the Constitution was 
derailed halfway through the ratification process with the rejection of Dutch and French 
voters. 
  With the project put on hold until more favorable conditions would emerge, 
observers had been looking towards the German presidency of the EU in the first 
semester of 2007, keeping an eye on the results of France's April-May elections. The 
energy of the German government and the disposition of the new leadership in Paris 
would certainly determine the future course of the EU. Attention was given especially to 
the expectations raised by the Berlin Declaration, issued by the German government on 
March 25
th, 2007, the 50
th birthday of the EU.    
    Anniversaries, especially centennials and half-a-century commemorations, are 
irresistible occasions for defending arguments and counteracting different theses in 
regard to political and economic processes. Comparing previous times with current 
circumstances is sometimes a fruitful exercise for deciphering situations that are difficult 
to grasp and that present a challenge to keen observers and citizens in general. Metaphors 
and images often provide added value for a better understanding of complex situations.  
  The European Union, an entity that has been solidly anchored in the evolution of 
the dramatic events of the last century, has been equipped with metaphorical symbols. 
Most of its successive stages have been proposed as resembling the chapters of human 
life and the works of mankind. The EU has been, for example, proposed as a mirror 
image of an emblematic architectural anchor, the cathedral (Barón, Roy 2003). Built over 
a period of several years, and in some cases centuries, only experts knew what they were 
constructing, much like the technocratic founding fathers of the EU. The 50
th anniversary 
of the Treaty of Paris of 1952 founding the European Coal and Steel Community 
(ECSC), that legally ceased to exist when it exhausted its official fifty-year term and that 
had been inspired by the Shuman Declaration of 1950, coincided with the 125
th 
anniversary of the birth of Antoni Gaudí, the creator of the temple of the Sagrada Familia 
in Barcelona. Fascination surrounding the temple for many stems from its long-sought 
termination, something that several generations have concluded is beyond their lifespan. 
This emblematic sample of an unfinished cathedral resembles the long evolution of the 
EU, with no clear ending (Roy 2003). Other observers have equated the EU to a river that 
flows rapidly in some parts, very slowly in others, through narrow terrain and over an 
expanded territory.  
More recently (see below), the EU has also been compared with a ship that has 
run aground, in light of the difficulties surrounding the approval of its constitutional 
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treaty. More precisely, it seems like the EU ship has run into an iceberg, much like the 
Titanic did a little less than a century ago. Though it belonged to an important class (the 
Olympic), the Titanic was one of a kind, much as the EU has been to date. Although the 
Titanic was lost in 1912, it was laid out in 1909. That is a century earlier than the 
scheduled elections for the EU Parliament, the appointment of the new president of the 
EU Commission, and the date for the implementation of some of the most innovative 
aspects of the marooned EU constitutional text. Among them are the new Minister of 
Foreign Affairs and the more stable EU Presidency. In sum, 2009 (a year confirmed by 
the Berlin Declaration to make crucial decisions) was set as a new time marker for the 
EU, similar to the conception date for the Titanic. In the event that some of the 
alternatives proposed for making the survival the present constitutional project possible 
are successful, 2012, the 100
th anniversary of the Titanic may coincide with the 
consolidation of the rescuing of the EU “Titanic” constitution. The competing alternative 
for this operation is the method of “cherry-picking” some of the most special aspects of 
the EU text.                                         
The essence of the European Union has been the subject of endless debates 
regarding the true nature, purpose and impact of the most successful regional integration 
and cooperation scheme among sovereign states that history has ever recorded. However, 
when in times of relative crisis, loud voices and scandalous cries of concern take the 
stage to demand the dismantling of the European project or its radical transformation. 
Alternatively, it is disdainfully exiled to a state of anonymity. After embarking on the 
adoption of the euro as a common currency and proceeding to its most spectacular 
enlargement, the EU provided itself with a “constitutional” shroud to cover its ever larger 
home. The project was derailed in the middle of the referendum process, and threatened 
with the sinking of the integration ship. Then, calls were made to salvage this European 
Titanic.  
 
 
The role of Spain      
 
  As a prelude to the completion of two decades of membership in the European 
Union (1986-2006), Spain wanted to send a message of leadership in the European 
integration process. With an impressive participation in the Convention tasks that 
prepared the text of the Treaty, the new Spanish government that was elected in March of 
2004, after the terrorist attacks in Madrid, decided to take a risk and be the first of the 
group of member states that submitted the ratification process to a public referendum. 
76.73 percent of the participating voters (42.3 percent of the actual electorate) said “yes”, 
setting the pace for the rest to emulate. With the failure of both the process brought about 
by the Dutch and French referendums and the long “reflection” period, Spain again took 
the lead. 
  The record of Spain’s membership in the European Union is truly impressive.
3 
Even during the second part of the Franco regime, the Spanish dictatorial leadership tried 
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to cope with requirements that were politically impossible to meet. Admitting that 
becoming a member was an illusive utopia, the government insisted on maintaining a 
solid link with the EC institutional structure. Meanwhile, the country’s presence in a 
reconstructed Europe was barely made possible through alternative networks such as 
preferential trade agreements and security arrangements with the United States, leading to 
entry into NATO in 1982. At the same time, the work of academics rigorously followed 
the integration process with the result that, when Spain became a member of the EC, 
numerous experts and scholars were ready to join the effort and strengthen the resources 
available in Spanish universities and publishing networks.
4  At the same time, the best 
and the brightest of Spain’s governmental cadres joined the expanded institutions, taking 
on positions of responsibility and decision-making (Viñas 2004, 2006; Granell 2002). 
Spain, in sum, “was not different”, as a redrafting of the tourism slogan crafted by the 
Franco regime would say. It was a European country like any other that was returning to 
its natural home after a long exile. 
  In the background of successful EU Spanish presidencies, prominent Spaniards 
had the experience of chairing the European Court of Justice (Gil-Carlos Rodríguez 
Iglesias) and the Parliament (Enrique Barón, José-María Gil Robles, and Josep Borrell), 
holding key positions in the Commission, and filling the newly created position of High 
Representative for the Common Foreign and Security Policy (Javier Solana). When the 
process of drafting the Constitutional Treaty was announced, rather than regarding it as a 
standard duty, Spain became very passionate about the mission. 
  A review of recent history would also show that the Spanish path through the EU 
labyrinth offers a perceptive oscillation. Observers can easily note the enthusiasm with 
which the successive administrations, starting with Felipe González in 1982, approached 
the process of European integration, priming the supranational path. This pattern would 
subtly contrast with the fractious ambivalence expressed at times by the government of 
José María Aznar, more inclined towards an intergovernmental approach, especially 
during his second term from 2000 to 2004 supported by an absolute majority (Pipes, Roy 
2005). In part because of the adventure taken by U.S. President George W. Bush in Iraq, 
Aznar led the inclination of the “New Europe” towards a neo-Atlantism, damaging the 
deepening of the EU.  
  Nonetheless, the Spanish government, the academic community, and the media 
exerted an impressive influence on making the role of Spain in the Convention process a 
model of participation. The government (and the representatives of the Popular Party, 
delegated by Madrid) actively participated in the elaboration of the text of the 
Constitution.
5  However, in the last stages of the proceedings of the Intergovernmental 
Conference (IGC) that took on the task given by the Convention, the government of 
Spain led by Aznar left the process in a frozen state when it refused to accept the new 
double majority voting system that modified the line up that had been in effect since the 
Treaty of Nice.
6 This decision retarded the process and created poor timing, casting 
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further doubts on other electorates and governments eager to obtain last minute 
advantages of dubious effective power results. Only the electoral victory of the PSOE in 
2004 removed this obstacle.
7 The new government diplomatically consented to a new 
modification of the double majority, opening the way for the ratification process that 
proceeded throughout much of 2005 and getting ready for completion at the end of 2006. 
This was viewed as one of the milestones of the new Spanish foreign policy (León 2004). 
  The Spanish government then dutifully contributed to the promotion of the project 
in public opinion circles.
8 That is the reason why when the period of ratification was 
announced, Spain decided to lead the pack. Interpreting the internal constitutional 
mandate with a sense of extreme dignity and importance, Spain not only elected to 
submit the approved text to a national referendum, but Madrid also scheduled that the 
Spanish elections as the first of several in February 2005, setting a precedent and an 
example for the rest. When an overwhelming majority of the (disappointing turnout) 
participants voted “yes”, Spain was on record as being ready to maintain its status of 
good Europeaness.
9 Then, the shock came. The negative referendum in France and the 
Netherlands derailed this rosy scenario.        
  In spite of the bad omens provided by analysts (Closa, 2004), polls and surveys 
held in France and the Netherlands, the first immediate reaction to the results of the 
referendums was of disbelief. Then, doubt about the European process set in. When the 
initial trauma was overcome, the sentiment about the overall picture of the EU and its 
constitutional process was a resigned feeling that “no one is perfect”. Then, this was 
followed by a mission to pave the way towards a “resurrection” solution, propelled by a 
counter attack strategy. Ultimately, there was a feeling of “don’t blame me for trying” 
that emerged to deal with the failure.  
 
 
Governmental assessment    
 
Few sectors of Spanish society, government, political parties, media, the 
analytical community, and the scholarly circles have remained absent from the debates on 
the constitutional process. An attempt to summarize the different stances and positions on 
the fundamental and detailed aspects of the constitutional text would occupy a space that 
it not available in this brief monographic essay.
10 The option is to select some 
representative samples of official, scholarly, and analytical productions that, as a 
collective body, would provide a glimpse of the Spanish perception of the impasse, the 
alternatives available, and the implications for Spanish interests. For this purpose, among 
the candidates to represent the mainstream lines of thought are a couple of key official 
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documents produced by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, a set of analytical papers 
generated by the Real Instituto Elcano, commentaries that appeared in policy-oriented 
journals such as Política Exterior, and a bibliographical reference of scholarly products in 
the form of books and journal articles.
11 
  As soon as the reality check produced by the French and Dutch rejections set in, 
the Spanish government took on the task of commissioning studies on the background, 
alternatives, and consequences for Spanish interests. In September 2005, the Joint 
Commission of the Spanish Congress and Senate for the European Union government 
entrusted the Spanish Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Secretaría 2006) to draft a report. 
After outlining the most salient aspects of the background of the document, the report 
stressed the obvious fact that it is a treaty that needs to be approved by each and all of the 
member states, an aspect that led to the surprising rejection by two founding members. 
Polls initially attributed this outcome to disagreements on defects in the general scope of 
the text and the ratification strategy. This simplistic explanation did not take into account 
the complex domestic issues of the two countries in question (fear of immigration, 
economic deterioration, citizen alienation). 
  When the reflection period did not deliver any perceptible results, a line up of 
different national attitudes in the countries that had already voted “yes” was detected by 
Spanish governmental experts. First, some countries (with Belgium in the lead) wanted to 
push the ratification process forward, running the risk of a split in the EU network. While 
Germany and Italy seemed to share this view, the fear about loosing France in the process 
signaled a note of caution, a sentiment shared by Spain. A second group of countries was 
then composed of states that had already ratified the text and would like to salvage it. A 
third group would be composed of new members of the EU that were still surprised and 
extremely concerned about having joined an organization characterized by confusion. In 
terms of the sector of states that had not yet ratified the constitutional treaty, three other 
groups were also prominent: those that have simply postponed the process, countries that 
have serious doubts (the UK), and the two that explicitly rejected the text. 
  In light of this situation, several alternatives were opened up for examination by 
Spanish experts. Reduced to two, first was the recourse to hold a second referendum in 
France and the Netherlands. Second was the option of a limited revision of the text. 
Outside of the realm of the current constitutional treaty, the Spanish analysis 
contemplated: (1) the elaboration of a new treaty, (2) the use of the possibilities existing 
in the current treaties, and (3) a limited reform of the Treaty of Nice. The official analysis 
did not accept as feasible (for legal or political reasons) some extremist measures such as: 
(1) the separation from the Union of members rejecting the Treaty, (2) a new “Union” 
(“Europe a la carte”) for the states wishing to move forward, and (3) the elimination of 
the ratification requirement for all and each of the members. 
  Facing this sensitive and challenging atmosphere, the analysis made by the 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs recommended taking action with a sense of “responsibility 
and commitment, combined with firmness and decision”. The reflection period should 
had been fully exploited, without announcing a magical solution or sending exploratory 
balloons. A close dialogue with the citizens should had been implemented in line with the 
European Commission Plan “D” (centered on a strategy of information and explanation 
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to citizens). Regarding Spanish interests, the impressive record and investment made in 
the ratification process would always force Spain to do everything possible for the project 
to continue. However, instead of letting the remaining period to be controlled by national 
interests, Spain should advocate a European-wide debate.  
  Moreover, the analysis recalled that Spain’s record after twenty years of effective 
membership has earned it a leadership position among the big five. Instead of sending a 
catastrophic message of chaos unless the project is approved, a positive stance towards 
public opinion was considered a better choice. The rest of the reflection period should be 
then dedicated to selling the EU as efficient, to studying the types of measures that would 
bring the EU closer to its citizens, and addressing national inclinations and concerns. 
Pretending that the EU treaty would be fully implemented may be the best tactic to win 
the citizen’s confidence. This would be a remake of the “de facto solidarity” that was the 
trademark of the foundational stages. Spain should form a strong alliance with veteran 
states that are committed to the EU consolidation, as well as with countries still pending 
ratification. 
  A year later, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs issued a follow-up report (Secretaría 
2007) in which the option of renegotiating the standing treaty was discarded, giving way 
to a partial or limited revision, an alternative defended by several States, although many 
that have already ratified the treaty would prefer that the changes remain minimal. In any 
event, the assessment is that a second failure would constitute a serious blow to the 
Union, most especially if coming from one of the powerful countries. Hence, the revision 
would have a greater possibility of being ratified if it were to add (a social protocol) or 
eliminate some items. The variances would include: reducing the text to parts I and II, 
resulting in a mini treaty (as proposed by French presidential candidate Nicolas Sarkozy), 
a two-step schedule with a reformed Nice treaty and a new text after 2009 (as suggested 
by Luxemburg), a “core treaty” (an idea floated by Italian Foreign Minister Massimo 
D’Alema), and the Plan B proposed by EU Parliament Member Andrew Duff (preserving 
the Charter, and adding some novelties). 
  Taking the whole range of attitudes into consideration, there were three main 
sources of disagreement. (1) First, some considered the principles as being the most 
important part of the treaty; others, the policies; and a third group (Spain included) 
thought that the balance and fragile equilibrium should be preserved. (2) Some judged 
that the most controversial items should be eliminated, others considered that the new 
text should correct that problem, while still others opted for a combined strategy. (3) The 
third source of disagreement came from the method of the reform: some rejected the idea 
of another convention, while others accepted it if it came equipped with a clear agenda.  
  Considering the daunting schedule that precedes the end of 2009 (budget 
preservation, new EU Commission, 2009 parliamentary elections, candidacy of Croatia, 
in addition to several national elections), a proposed end of 2007 intergovernmental 
conference may have to face a “grand package deal”, including several lengthy 
negotiations. However, this alternative was also considered risky if it was to be tackled  
at the same time, in an effort to lead toward an option of “enhanced cooperation”. In any 
event, the first test case would be to see what the March 25, 2007 declaration would 
consist of and what its consequences would be. A consensus pointed out to the idea that 
the text should include the achievements of the EU, the values of the European process, 
and the present and future challenges (the most sensible part) faced by the Union.    11
With all this in mind, the report outlined the interests and the position of Spain. 
First of all, a fact that needs to be stressed is that Spain had ratified the constitutional 
treaty twice, both in a public national referendum and through parliament. This double 
coup was the crowning touch to an impressive avant-garde position that Spain has taken 
since it became a member of the EC in 1986. Therefore, Spain was obliged to maintain its 
position for the continuation of the agreement as expressed in the text. Spain and the 
other seventeen countries that have approved the text had the moral obligation to insist 
that the essence of the treaty be preserved. Hence, a limited implementation could not be 
accepted as sufficient. In any event, Spain was in a comfortable position. It had fulfilled 
its obligations and it had no interest in opening a negotiation in which it could loose. The 
burden of opening the treaty was on the countries that had rejected it or were dubious 
about it.  
The main weapons for Spain were: (1) the solid pro-European consensus built by 
the two main political parties; (2) the ample ratification margin; (3) the acceptance of a 
new double majority voting system (but only in the context of a new distribution of seats 
in the Parliament); and (4) considerable backing of Spanish public opinion. Armed in this 
way, Spain should be able to act skillfully at the right moment, forging alliances with 
important members, and maintaining close contact with the main institutions. In this line 
of thinking, the initiative taken in Madrid set an example and it had also been sending a 
strong message of leadership. 
 
 
Bold action 
 
  Within this array of alternative scenarios, the Spanish government wished to send 
a clear message. It consisted of pointing out that the option of proceeding towards the 
completion of the referendum process, while considering the text still alive and useful, 
was a valid card to be played. Consequently, as a repeat of the Spanish initiative two 
years earlier that led to the ratification process, the representatives of eighteen European 
countries of the EU (with the moral support of two other) met in Madrid on January 25, 
2007. These twenty Member States had already approved the constitutional project or had 
promised to do so (Portugal and Ireland). Only Spain and Luxemburg had ratified the 
complicated code in popular referendum. The rest had prudently bestowed their seal of 
approval through a parliamentary process (Torreblanca 2007). 
  These “Friends of the Constitution”, as they called themselves, had a common 
goal. They yearned for the revival of the approval process. They regret ed with pain that a 
handful of millions of European citizens had taken as hostages more than 60 percent of 
the population of the EU, numbering half a billion citizens. Twenty Member States had 
seen their EU plans derailed and frozen by the stubbornness shown by two dissidents 
(actually, only a portion of their potential electorates) and the ambivalence expressed by 
three others (the United Kingdom and the governments of the Czech Republic and 
Poland).  
  For this reason, the majority of the Europeanist and federally-inclined population 
considered that the result, in the first place, was not fair. In the second place, it damaged 
the general welfare of the EU in a complex and uncertain world that needs the effective 
action of political blocs and economic conglomerates, equipped with impacting influence   12
and political vision. An EU marooned half way, with institutions initially designed for a 
half a dozen of members, and already housing twenty seven, is not the best way forward. 
  Faced with this situation, the Spanish government took the initiative and 
convoked the Madrid meeting to exchange ideas that would help the EU get out of the 
constitutional trap. The government of Rodríguez Zapatero seemed to have taken the 
same risk it accepted when coming to power in 2004, when it planned the early 
referendum as a launching pad of its Europeanist example. Spain delivered magnificently 
with more than two thirds of the voters saying “yes” to the text. 
  Nonetheless, the subsequent difficulties of the ratification process advised Madrid 
to allow for a margin of prudence during the “reflection period” while searching for 
solutions. This term was exhausted without innovative ideas. Hence, the Spanish 
government took the initiative, coinciding with the German presidency, of providing an 
incentive for finding a solution. It was not easy and the meeting ended with no decisions. 
It was further discovered that even this group of “friends” had contrastive opinions. 
Under the pressure from other governments, Luxemburg decided to postpone its follow-
up meeting.  
  The record and the background of the extraordinary Madrid conclave showed that 
Spain and the most daring allies considered that the text should be further reinforced with 
social warranties and strengthened by the subsidiarity dimension (respect for state and 
local sovereignty). They also demanded better protection for the environment, active 
attention to climatic change, expanded legislation to regulate immigration, an effective 
energy policy, more precise conditions for new membership, and a deepening of the 
European security and defense policy. 
  Other members, using a more cautious approach, signaled that these measures are 
already present in the existing treaties. The text then should be reduced to codify some of 
the most innovative initiatives: a stable presidency with a term of two and a half years, 
extended to two terms in total, a Foreign Minister doubling as Vice President of the 
Commission, the expansion of the qualified majority vote, and reinforcement of the 
power of the Parliament. This represented a challenge for the German presidency, facing 
a unique opportunity to demonstrate leadership and search for equilibrium.  
  Spanish observers took note that the German presidency elected to draw a “road 
map” to salvage the substance of the EU Constitution in a reduced version. This strategy 
was interpreted not only as a calendar, but also as being composed of processes and 
principles. A close reading of Merkel’s address to the European Parliament meant for 
independent analysts from Madrid that the German political ambitions were too weak, 
but worth trying out. First, the German proposal could be identified with its own national 
view. Second, Germany had not yet completed its ratification process, subject to demands 
of the Constitutional Court. Third, calls from France for a mini-treaty might mean that 
Germany could elect not to act against French interests and be inclined towards a 
reformed Nice treaty.  
  The convocation of the Madrid meeting was the subject of several points of 
criticism. First, the claim that it interfered with the German presidency plans was not 
considered valid, because governments such as Spain’s have the right to defend their 
interests and be influential. Second, it is true that the substance of the gathering 
represented an uncomfortable feeling for the French candidates, placing the issue in the 
middle of the electoral campaign. Third, it increased the risk of dividing the Member   13
States into “good” (the ones that have ratified the text) and “bad” (the ones that have not). 
And fourth, the move runs the risk of opening a gap in the “yes” camp. Nonetheless, this 
line of analysis indicated that many countries have called for a Spanish leadership role, a 
wish that has been cautiously contemplated by the government. Nonetheless, weighing 
risks and obligations, the Spanish government would have to opt for action. (Torreblanca 
2007; López Castillo).  
 
 
Declining cherry-picking, choosing ship-rescuing 
 
The Spanish think tank community led the way in the task of fine-tuning the 
contextual circumstances of the impasse and the alternatives available to Spain. Some 
observers chose an optimistic attitude; others elected a realistic analysis, while others 
pressed for the strategy that would prove most advantageous for Spain.
12 Within the 
varied range of opinions commissioned by the Real Instituto Elcano, in early 2006, a year 
after the successful Spanish referendum, Francisco Aldecoa (Aldecoa 2006) pointed out 
that Spanish opinion went from a decisive backing for the project to considering the 
Constitution as dead, finally opting to resurrect it. He outlined 14 points to follow when 
studying the situation.  
Regarding the process, (1) Aldecoa came to the conclusion that the problem 
resided in the political path taken, not in the constitutional details, and that (2) the treaty 
was reinforced by democratic legitimacy provided by the Convention. Then (3) the 
Constitution supplied the EU with advances in efficiency and presence in the world. This 
was an added value, not the cause for the delay. Politically, (4) it had received the 
approval of the EU Parliament and the ratification of 14 (later 18) countries, representing 
over 50% of the European citizens. The problem was not a European concern–it was a 
domestic issue regarding France and the Netherlands. But the collateral damage (7) was 
that citizens perceived the EU as ineffective in pursuing its goals. (8) The process had 
failed because it became national, rather than European. (9) The prevailing Nice 
framework does not account for an EU of over 25 countries. (10) The delay already 
extracted a high cost. Ironically, (11) some of the projected constitutional measures were 
already being implemented. (12) Some of the democracy, efficiency and world presence 
measures are already irreversible. (13) Some of the political background has been 
changing (prospects of the (German presidency, the economy). And (14), as the 
circumstances of 2007 would confirm, some EU leaders had come forward to speak on 
behalf of the reactivation of the process. The key was to find a political solution for what 
is a combination of European and national dilemmas.                              
The Real Instituto Elcano offered an elaborate report (Rodríguez-Iglesias- 
Torreblanca). It was a greatly reduced outline of different scenarios that evolved out of 
the constitutional impasse and an evaluation of the potential benefits and disadvantages 
for Spain. First, the report insisted on identifying the divorce between the citizens and the 
elites on “the direction and content of main European policies”. Then, the difficult 
consensus among the States had led to a freezing of the decision-making process, making 
future enlargements doubtful and cumbersome. The existing veto power made the 
                                                 
12 The Real Instituto Elcano had earlier issued a study with a much wider scope on the general European 
policy of Spain (Powell 2005).   14
revision and ratification procedures inefficient, causing the stalemate. In light of this 
crisis, the drafters took into consideration the fact that the new policies should meet the 
demands of citizens in areas such as internal and external security, immigration, energy 
security, and climate change. There is a need for a more efficient institutional framework, 
something that will only be possible with a more responsive ratification procedure. 
Finally, the report called for a more decisive leadership role. 
  Considering these needs and recommendations, the report then outlined four main 
scenarios.
13 The first, the best for Spain and the EU according to the authors, was the 
rather utopian ratification of the text as it was, or without major changes. Although not 
the most likely, it could be the fastest way to overcome the difficulties. Backed by the 
large number of countries that had ratified it, one still has to take the unanimity rule into 
account. The second scenario is characterized by a will to salvage the Constitution, 
accepting the modification of the text, in essence, resembling the present treaty. 
Considered risky because of the demand for unanimity and the difficulty in chopping off 
the negative parts, a new Intergovernmental Conference (IGC) would dissect the text to 
rescue the most innovative parts, with the eighteen countries that had already approved 
the original document in the leading role. This was considered as the best option for 
Spain, in which it had a golden opportunity to influence and persuade other members. 
The third scenario was composed of a selective rescue, or cherry-picking of the easiest 
parts. It could result into a mini-treaty, less ambitious, resembling a reformatted Nice 
treaty. The risk is that this solution would invite individual states to select their favorite 
issues and defend them until the end. The key for the success of this alternative 
framework is to preserve “the equilibrium between constitutional and policy innovation”. 
A fourth scenario was represented by the blunt abandonment of the Constitutional Treaty 
and starting from scratch, with a new convention and a second IGC, moves that would  
either be made before the 2009 EU parliament elections or postponed until the panorama 
cleared up. 
While the official attitude was cautious and the selective analytical stance was 
critical, the Spanish observers are well aware that the option consisting of selecting some 
of the most fundamental items of the Constitution, as candidates in the formation of an 
acceptable document for approval, was considerably attractive. Whatever the Spanish 
calculations were regarding the different scenarios, the reality was that the front of 
resistance to the approval of the constitutional treaty, if pushed as an alternative to save 
face, would make the cherry picking method more preferable.
14 This method was backed 
by British diplomat John Kerr, who acted as Secretary General of the Convention, 
simultaneously helping to direct the EU process while looking out for UK interests. Kerr 
proposed that a selection of items be repackaged in a fancy basket (Kerr 2007). 
  Taking all of the above into consideration, individual analysts ventured into 
selecting some specific alternatives in general and some of the most beneficial for Spain 
                                                 
13 Earlier, Closa 2005 outlined six options that could be detected as a base.    
 
14 Meanwhile, ironically, the internal policies of the single market envisioned 50 years ago, revealed that 
with ingenuity and marketing, mixed with subsidies provided by the Common Agricultural policy (CAP), 
the EU was able to produce a luxurious cherry selling for €0.81 (about US 1.05) a unit.                  
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in particular. Although it was independently developed based on the Titanic metaphor 
exposed above, and using descriptions based on maritime experience, Araceli Mangas 
(Mangas 2007) offered a useful parallel with the process of salvaging ships and 
merchandise after accidents, particularly those that are at risk of sinking. This was not 
surprising when taking into account that the states, governments, international 
organizations and the EU in particular have been equated to ships and their leaders to 
captain and pilots, responsible for sailing safely through seas as rough as the treacherous 
ones created by the current impasse faced by the European project. Eliminating the first 
scenario (it was unthinkable that the text, left as was, would be ratified by all states) as 
outlined by the Elcano committee, Mangas proceeded to present a clear choice: (a) 
salvaging the ship (the Titanic) by getting rid of unneeded merchandise, heavy loads, and 
the ballast, or (b) letting it sink and salvaging the most desirable goods. 
  In the event that the rescue of the Titanic-Constitution was selected, following a 
damaging collision with the “iceberg” represented by the French and Dutch referendums, 
two sub-alternatives were offered. They were similar to the scenarios II and III as 
outlined by the Elcano commission. One contemplated the sinking of the ship and then 
proceeded to salvage the most precious cargo, previously removed by several smaller 
boats, and finally transferring it to the safety of the port. The author, in this case, would 
then proceed to select the items most worthy of being salvaged: the Charter of 
Fundamental Rights, the clause linking the EU to the Human Rights Convention, the 
solidarity clause, the enhanced cooperation in security and defense, the popular initiative, 
the ability of the Committee of Regions to address the Court, the early alert mechanism to 
allow national parliaments and regions to participate in the legislative process, an 
enhanced use of qualified majority voting, Parliamentary control over the totality of the 
budget, the establishment of the position of the Minister of Foreign Affairs, and a more 
stable presidency. This generous “cherry-picking” was not considered to be the best 
solution by the expert, a position reflective of the inclinations of Spanish scholars and 
government officials. 
  The other option considered by the author was based on salvaging the ship, in its 
entirety—in other words, not only its “content” but also its “container”. It should be 
composed of a fundamental “Framework Treaty” (abandoning the term “Constitution”), 
which should be an agreement emphasizing synthesis, supplemented by a “General 
Treaty”. This would be backed by the conviction that the hull (the “framework treaty”) 
was good, that the overall philosophy is still unique in its class, and that it would benefit 
from the removal of unusable items. The internal elements included essential policies that 
make the Union work effectively and they were clearly outlined in the General Treaty 
(containing part III and the remaining sections of other parts).                                                         
  
 
Time to make a decision 
 
On the eve of the 50
th anniversary of the Treaty of Rome, the German presidency 
was mandated with the issuance of a Declaration. It was to be a short address, easily 
understood by the common citizens, but its background ran the risk of presenting it as a 
convoluted document that encountered difficulties in developing a consensus. Observers 
(Torreblanca 2007) accurately pointed out that the EU had previously missed the   16
opportunity to define itself both at the 50th anniversary of the Schuman Declaration and 
when the Treaty of the European Coal and Steel Community’s half-century term expired 
in 2002. Josep Borrell, the Spanish president of the EU Parliament, claimed that, in order 
to develop a declaration based on principles and values, the EU leadership would only 
have to look at the proposed constitutional treaty and read its preamble, part I and the 
Charter, key documents that all 25 members had signed and that now some were 
pretending to ignore. For its part, the Commission insisted on taking measures 
counteractive to the rejection referendum by stressing the need to complete the internal 
market, deepen social dimensions, reinforce the space for freedom, security and justice, 
open up a debate on future enlargements, establish coherence on issues of external action, 
implicate national parliaments in the legislative process, and achieve an agreement on 
institutional reform. The Declaration would therefore represent a substantive exercise, 
rather than just a bland historical commemoration. 
With this in mind, Torreblanca recalled that early in 2006 the President of the 
Commission, José Manuel Barroso, addressed the EU Parliament with a wish list: 
“solidarity” in terms of economic and social cohesion; environmental sustainability; 
institutional responsibility; “security” perceptible by the citizens; and the promotion of 
EU values in the world. Even though the Council had accepted this political scope in 
mid-2006, the conclave held at the end of the year limited itself to the commemoration 
and the reaffirmation of the values of the European process. 
Following the constitutional gathering organized by the Spanish government in 
Madrid, the difficulties of the process became increasingly evident. Though the 
Commission insisted on the endorsement and the social reinforcement of the five 
priorities expressed by Barroso, the UK expressed satisfaction with the EU’s enlargement 
and the fall of the Berlin wall, while the Czech and Polish governments insisted on the 
insertion of liberalism, Atlanticism and the Christian roots of Europe. Whereas Sarkozy’s 
proposal of a mini-treaty was surpassed by a majority soliciting a “Constitution-plus”, the 
alarm sounded when signals from London indicated that the Labour party would avoid 
the “Europeanization” of the election in 2008 at all cost. Ironically, the strategy of 
respecting the “red lines” in order to anchor the UK in the EU was no longer valid. 
Among other reasons, this is because these privileges have enraged the Left in countries 
like France. In fact, the French “no” made the UK referendum practically impossible. 
Although representative of only a minority in the overall picture, Belgium and other 
states would push for provocation of the unthinkable. 
Finally, after much speculation and last minute details, language reformulation 
and in-depth analysis, the Declaration was issued, reflecting a minimal consensus and a 
strategy developed by the presidency that had limited success. The very short text (barely 
650 words) had an introductory section in which the EU congratulates itself on its 
accomplishments. It deals with the combination of the rights of “the individual”, the 
uncertainty of the world arena, and then outlines the EU’s most valuable dimensions. 
Finally, Section III of the Declaration returns to the “unification” of Europe as a dream of 
“earlier generations” that has now become a reality. However, history reminds us that we 
must “always renew the political shape of Europe in keeping with the times.” That is the 
reason why today we are “united in our aim of placing the European Union on a renewed 
common basis before the European Parliament elections in 2009.” In any event, the 
Declaration pledges once again that “Europe is our common future.”   17
Although the word “constitution” was dropped from the text, it still read as having 
the intention of finding a solution for a documentary commitment to the spirit and 
purpose of the Constitutional Treaty. The time frame provided a temporal context for the 
“road map” which is supposed to be issued at the end of the German presidency in June 
of 2007. Skeptics evaluated this compromise simply as a postponement of the thorniest 
issues, such as those detected by the Polish government regarding the voting system. The 
same can be said about the diplomatic compromise to gloss over the European socio-
economic “model”, a source of conflicting interpretations during the disastrous 
ratification process in France and the Netherlands.                                       
In anticipation of this uncertain scenario, certain sectors of Spanish analytical and 
governmental communities recommended that the remaining valid option was to take on 
a more aggressive position, sending warning messages, and to wait for the looming 
possibility of an unconvincing or very controversial Declaration or for a call for a 
subsequent IGC with unknown results. The worse case scenario could be a “rupture of 
the system or selective demolition of the process” (Torreblanca 6). 
In the Spanish domestic context, two issues might had, both in theory and 
practice, posed obstacles for the development of an effective strategy towards this goal. 
The energy of the Spanish government might be eroded in the future for two reasons. One 
is the potential lack of consensus about the nature of the European mission, crafted by the 
two main political parties. Considering the continuous harassment by the Popular Party 
since its defeat, the temptations to use the EU stalemate to attack the PSOE and to show a 
lack of support remain a possibility. This confrontation would then be staged within the 
context of the elections to be held before March 2008 (a limit according to the electoral 
law). However, the benefits of the risky policy executed by the Popular Party are 
negligible in comparison with the potential to develop a minimal level of support. The 
second source of danger was reflected by the pressure of the latest wave of ETA 
terrorism, derailing the announced truce with the bombing of the Madrid airport parking 
lot. Although the attention given by the Spanish government to this problem is 
paramount, expert opinions indicate that it can still achieved with a strong commitment to 
the European project.  
 
Conclusion  
In terms of the constitutional process and its possible outcomes, what do all of the 
above alternatives represent for Spain? Both sets of scenarios, the catastrophic one 
outlined in some analytical calculations and the variations that could develop based on 
the potential paths to be taken, were, in some ways, positive for Spain on the grounds 
that, at all times, whatever decision were made, there would be a strong emphasis on the 
defense of the investments made until then. Spain did not have anything to lose by 
applying pressure and insisting on the continuation of a positive process that called 
attention to the spirit of the constitutional path and its most necessary ‘container’ (the 
“ship”). By abandoning the strategy and tactics followed until then, Spain would be 
“rewarded” either with a less favorable position in the future of the EU or with being 
labeled as a supporter of a potentially dying dream. While still seeking to maintain a   18
strong leadership position, and in the event of a catastrophe, the Spanish government and 
its collaborators could simply point to the fact that they did their best. 
For the above reasons, the Spanish government maintained a solid commitment 
first to the salvaging of the letter and the spirit of the constitutional treaty. Then a basic 
consensus developed at the end of the German presidency showing that a strong majority 
of Member States were in favor of supporting a script presented by Chancellor Angela 
Merkel regarding the complete abandoning of the constitutional path. The choice then 
was to approve the skeleton of a “reform” treaty. Madrid then sent clear signals that there 
were some fundamental aspects that should be respected from the spirit of the 
constitutional treaty. It then acted as a loyal partner in supporting the German initiative 
and leadership, which was praised by Spanish commentators
15 and then forming a 
practical coalition with the new French president in convincing the hardliners (Poland 
and the United Kingdom) that a compromise was in order.
16  
  The scholarly and media reaction to this outcome revealed that a substantial 
majority expressed general satisfaction, stressing the positive dimensions of the solution, 
based on the fact that it included the most fundamental institutional reforms envisioned in 
the defunct constitutional text (Martín, Torreblanca 2007, Mangas 2007). A notable 
number of observers and media editorials pointed out to areas of concern (El País 2007, 
“El nombre”; Baquero). A strong minority expressed anger and deception for the path 
taken by the Union, casting doubts over its prospective future regarding the limitations of 
the supranational aim and the perceived return to the intergovernmental logic (Sotelo, 
Vidal Folch). Overall, government and analytical sources targeted the negative role of the 
Polish government in resisting making a deal over the final text
17 expressing fears of 
impact over the drafting of the “Reform Treaty” (of Lisbon) and its ratification process in 
2008, on time for its implementation in 2009.    
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